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We consider the problem of detecting norm vi-
olations in open multi-agent systems (MAS). In
this extended abstract, we outline the approach of
[Alechina et al., 2018], and show how, using ideas
from scrip systems, we can design mechanisms
where the agents comprising the MAS are incen-
tivised to monitor the actions of other agents for
norm violations.
1 Introduction
Norms have been widely proposed as a means of coordinating
and controlling the behaviour of agents in a multi-agent sys-
tem (MAS). Norms specify the behaviours that agents should
follow to achieve the objectives of the MAS. For example, the
designer of a system to allow agents to post content (invita-
tions to tender for work, prices of goods or services, etc.) may
wish to ensure that the postings are relevant, accurate and up
to date.
In a MAS where norms must be enforced, the responsibil-
ity for enforcing norms lies with a system component termed
the normative organisation [Dastani et al., 2009], which con-
tinuously monitors the actions of the agents (and perhaps car-
ries out other tasks on behalf of the MAS). If an action (or
the state resulting from an action) violates or would violate
a norm, the action is either prevented, or the agent that per-
formed the action is penalised (incurs a sanction). The effec-
tive monitoring of agent actions is therefore key to enforc-
ing norms in a MAS. However, in large systems with many
agents, maintaining a separate component to monitor the ac-
tions of the agents may involve significant overhead for the
MAS.
In [Alechina et al., 2018], we propose an approach to norm
monitoring in open multi-agents systems in which the mon-
itoring of agent actions is performed by the agents compris-
ing the MAS. We term this decentralised monitoring. We
focus on norms that prohibit certain actions (or the result-
ing state), for example, posting irrelevant or inaccurate con-
tent may be prohibited. The novelty of our approach is that
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the MAS does not need to bear the cost of paying for mon-
itoring; at the same time we do not need to assume that
fines can be levied on the agents who violate the norms and
used to pay for monitoring, as done in [Fagundes et al.,
2014]. The latter assumption does not hold for many open
systems where sanctioned agents can always leave the sys-
tem and, if needed, rejoin it later under a different identity.
Hence, a key issue for our approach is how to incentivise
the agents to monitor the actions of other agents. We show
how, using ideas from scrip systems [Friedman et al., 2006;
Kash et al., 2012; 2015], we can design incentive-compatible
mechanisms where the agents do the monitoring themselves.
We can think of scrip as “virtual money” or “tokens”. Per-
forming an action costs a token, and detecting violations is
rewarded with tokens. The main difference between our set-
ting and that of [Kash et al., 2015] (hereafter KFH) is that the
agents are not always rewarded after they monitor, but only if
they discover a violation. This requires a non-trivial adapta-
tion of the techniques developed by KFH.
In this abstract, we present the main ideas from [Alechina
et al., 2018]. We consider two settings. In the first, the inad-
vertent setting, actions that violate a norm are assumed to be
unintentional: violating a norm does not increase an agent’s
utility. In the second, the strategic setting, actions that vi-
olate the norm are intentional: violating the norm increases
the agent’s utility, and an agent chooses whether to try to vi-
olate the norm. We describe a mechanism that achieves per-
fect enforcement in the inadvertent setting; in equilibrium, all
actions are monitored and hence there are no violations of
the norm. In the strategic setting, we prove that there can
be no equilibrium with perfect enforcement. However, the
probability of violations can be made arbitrarily small: for all
 > 0, we can design a mechanism where, in equilibrium, the
probability of violations is at most .
2 Running Example
We consider a MAS where agents want to post content on
the web. There are norms regarding the content that may
be posted; for example, copyrighted images should not be
posted, and comments should not be abusive or defamatory.
We assume that agents may occasionally submit postings that
violate the norm. If such content appears on the web, this may
cause considerable harm to the MAS (e.g., it can be fined or
sued). (As is standard in the MAS literature, we are assum-
ing that the MAS is an entity independent of the agents that
use it, that may incur the computational costs associated with
monitoring and can be fined or sued.)
It is therefore in the MAS’s interest that submitted post-
ings are checked for compliance with the norm before they
appear on the web. We assume that it is possible to check
objectively if a particular item of content violates the norm.
(For simplicity, we assume that if a posting that violates the
norm is checked, the violation will be detected. We can eas-
ily modify our approach to handle the case where there is
some probability ρ of the violation being caught.) Checking
whether a posting is ‘bad’ (violates the norm) requires some
work, and incurs a small utility cost. Although checking re-
quires some resources, we assume that if a violation is found,
evidence of the violation can be provided that can be checked
in negligible time (so we do not need to deal with disputes
about whether content violates the norm). If the content does
violate the norm, the posting is discarded and no violation
occurs. We assume a basic infrastructure that ensures that
content submitted by an agent is signed, and that the digital
signatures can be trusted. The signature identifies the agent,
and is interpreted as a statement by the agent that the submit-
ted content conforms to the norm. Note, however, that the
infrastructure does not itself enforce the norm; it serves only
to ensure auditability. We believe that such a separation of
concerns is good design: the same basic infrastructure may
be used by different systems with different norms.
There is a system-level objective that content conform to
the norm, but since the cost to the MAS to check all submit-
ted postings may be prohibitive, we would like to distribute
the monitoring of submissions among the agents that use the
system. Just as for the MAS, checking a submission incurs
a small negative utility for an agent. This means that agents
must be appropriately incentivised to monitor. It should be
clear that the ideas exemplified by this scenario are applica-
ble far more broadly.
We formalise the submission and monitoring of content for
norm violations as a non-cooperative game. This scenario
(and the resulting game) is similar to the scenario considered
by KFH, but differs in several key respects. In the KFH set-
ting, an agent requests a service, and the problem is to incen-
tivise provision of the service; if the service is not provided,
the requesting agent will not be satisfied. Here, it is not nec-
essary that each submission be monitored for the submitting
agent to be satisfied. We assume that, if no agent monitors, it
is possible for the submitting agent to post and benefit from it;
however, a norm violation may be missed. A more significant
difference is that, in our setting, a submission may violate the
norm. This has no analogue in the setting of KFH, and does
complicate matters, as we shall see. Despite this, many of the
ideas used by KFH can be used in our setting. In particular,
we adopt the idea of using tokens as payment for submitting
a posting and as a reward for monitoring. In order to submit a
posting, an agent must pay one token; finding a bad posting is
rewarded by receiving one or more tokens as payment. This
encourages agents to volunteer to monitor submissions. The
exact mechanisms and amounts are discussed below.
3 Unintentional Violation
In this section, we formalise the “incentivisation game”. We
show that there exists an equilibrium using threshold strate-
gies if norm violations are unintentional, and that in this equi-
librium all violations are detected.
In the inadvertent setting, bad submissions happen with a
constant probability b, but agents are unaware that they are vi-
olating the norm when they submit something inappropriate.
For technical reasons, we assume that b is a rational number
(our results hold as long as we use a sufficiently good ap-
proximation to the true probability, so this assumption is re-
ally without loss of generality). The game in the inadvertent
setting is described by the following parameters:
• a finite set of n agents 1, . . . , n;
• the time between rounds is 1/n;
• in each round t an agent is picked at random to submit
a posting (we implicitly assume that agents always have
something that they want to post);
• probability of a submission being bad: b;
• utility of posting to the agent who posts: 1, (we assume
that the utility of posting is independent of whether what
is posted violates the norm, since violations are uninten-
tional);
• disutility of monitoring to the agent doing the monitor-
ing: −α (where 0 < α < 1);
• discount factor: δ ∈ (0, 1) (like KFH, we assume that
agents discount future payoffs).
The game runs forever. We assume for simplicity that the
system is homogeneous: all agents get the same utility for
posting (1), the same disutility for monitoring (−α), have the
same probability of being chosen to submit a posting (1/n),
and have the same discount factor (δ).1 At each round an
agent gets utility 1 if its submission is posted, utility −α if it
monitors and utility 0 otherwise.
To incentivise monitoring, we use tokens as payment for
submitting a posting and as a reward for monitoring. An agent
must pay one token in order to submit a posting. Agents are
rewarded with tokens only if they monitor and detect a bad
submission. We argue below that in order for the system to
function successfully (agents being able to submit postings,
and some agents always available for monitoring), the ‘right’
amount to pay for finding a bad submission is 1/b.2 This
means, in expectation, an agent gets one token for finding a
bad submission. Thus, the price of submitting a posting is
equal to the expected reward for checking a submission.
We need some additional notation to describe what hap-
pens:
• pt ∈ {1, . . . , n} is the agent chosen to submit a posting
in round t;
• V ti ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether agent i volunteers to mon-
itor in round t (V ti = 1). Whether an agent volunteers is
1Using ideas from [Kash et al., 2012; 2015], we can extend the
approach discussed here to deal with different types of agents, char-
acterised by different parameters.
2We are implicitly assuming that tokens are divisible into units
such that it is possible to transfer 1/b tokens.
determined by the agent’s strategy (which may depend
on pt).
• vt ∈ {0, . . . , n} \ {pt}; vt = j if agent j 6= pt such that
V tj = 1 is chosen to monitor in round t, and v
t = 0 if no
one is chosen to monitor in round t;
• f t ∈ {0, 1}; f t = 0 if the content submitted in round t
is good, f t = 1 if it is bad.
Given that good and bad postings have the same utility (1),
the utility of an agent i in round t is:
uti =
 1 if i = p
t, i has ≥ 1 token, and vt = 0 or f t = 0;
−α if vt = i;
0 otherwise.
Thus, an agent gets utility 1 in round t if it is chosen to submit
a posting (pt = i), it has at least one token, and either the
posting is not monitored (vt = 0) or it does not violate the
norm (f t = 0). Given the discount factor δ, the total utility
Ui for agent i is Σ∞t=0δ
t/n uti. Note that the number of tokens
that an agent has does not affect the agent’s utility. However,
as an agent requires a token to submit a posting, the number
of tokens that an agent has does have an indirect impact on
utility; if the agent has no tokens, then it will not be able to
submit a posting, and thus will forego the opportunity to get
utility 1.
Paying agents 1/b for finding a bad posting makes the sit-
uation similar to that considered by KFH, where the agent
wanting work done pays one token, and the agent doing the
work gets one token. However, the fact that in the current
setting payment is made only if a submission is found to be
bad complicates matters. An expected payment of 1 token is
not equivalent to an actual payment of 1 token! To under-
stand the issue here, note that the most obvious way to deal
with the payment of tokens is to have the agent who wants to
submit a posting pay one token to the normative organisation,
and then have the normative organisation pay 1/b tokens to
the monitor if a violation is detected. But there are problems
with this approach. If monitors have a long run of “bad luck”
and do not find submissions that violate the norm, agents will
have very few tokens on average; on the other hand, if mon-
itors get lucky, and find quite a few submissions that violate
the norm, agents will end up with many tokens on average.
As pointed out by KFH, having both too few or too many to-
kens will cause problems. Intuitively, with too many tokens,
(almost) everyone will have plenty of tokens, so no one will
volunteer to monitor; with too few tokens, it will often be the
case that the agent who is chosen to submit a posting will not
have a token to pay for the submission. This problem does not
occur in the setting of KFH, because there the payment made
by the agent requesting a service always matches exactly the
payment received by the agent providing the service.
We solve this problem by having the agents rather than the
normative organisation perform the role of the “bank”. When
agent i wants to submit a posting, it pays a randomly chosen
agent who has fewer than the maximum number of tokens al-
lowed (see below) 1 token; if an agent j monitors and finds
a violation, a randomly chosen agent with at least 1/b tokens
gives j 1/b tokens. This ensures that the number of tokens
in ‘circulation’ remains constant. (Note also that since the
agent that pays the monitoring agent is randomly chosen from
among those agents with at least 1/b tokens, agents may sub-
mit a posting as long as they have a single token. If the sub-
mitting agent were to pay the monitoring agent when a viola-
tion is detected, agents could not submit a posting unless they
have 1 + 1/b tokens.) It may seem counterintuitive to have a
random agent pay the penalty. However, since violations are
inadvertent and occur randomly, each agent pays the same
amount in penalties in expectation as if we had charged the
violator; moreover this approach has the advantage of mak-
ing the system run more smoothly.
We assume that all agents follow a threshold strategy when
deciding whether to monitor. There is a fixed threshold k such
that agents volunteer iff they have fewer than k tokens. It is
easy to see that there is an equilibrium in threshold strategies
if everyone uses a threshold of 0. In that case, no one ever
volunteers to monitor a submission, so everyone gets to post,
without monitoring. Of course, no agent has any incentive
to deviate from this strategy. On the other hand, this equilib-
rium runs counter to the purposes of the MAS. We are thus in-
terested in nontrivial equilibria in threshold strategies, where
everyone uses a threshold k > 0. Note that the maximum
number of tokens any agent may have is then k + 1/b. If an
agent i has at least one token and is chosen to submit a post-
ing (i = pt), pt gives a randomly chosen agent with fewer
than k + 1/b tokens one more. The subitting agent pt than
asks for volunteers to act as monitor. All agents with fewer
than k tokens volunteer. If at least one agent volunteers, one,
vt, is chosen at random to act as monitor. If vt confirms the
submission conforms to the norm, it is posted. If vt detects
a violation of the norm, then the posting is discarded, and a
randomly chosen agent with at least 1/b tokens gives vt 1/b
tokens.
Theorem 1 For all  > 0, there exist a δ sufficiently close
to 1 and an n sufficiently large such that if all n agents have
a discount factor δ′ ≥ δ, then there exists a k such that the
mechanism above with all agents using a threshold of k is an
-Nash equilibrium.
4 Intentional Violation
In this section, we show that there exists an equilibrium in
threshold strategies when norm violations are intentional, and
that in this equilibrium most violations are detected.
In the strategic setting, we assume that when an agent is
chosen to submit a posting, it can either submit something
good (i.e., that does not violate the norm) or something bad.
The parameters of the game are the same as in Section 3,
except that:
• there is no longer a probability b of a submission being
bad (the quality of a submission now becomes a strategic
decision); and
• the utility of a bad posting is no longer 1, but κ > 1
(we must assume κ > 1 here, otherwise no agent would
ever submit anything bad: the utility of doing so is no
higher than that of submitting something good, and the
violation may be detected).
As before, monitoring agents get paid only if they find a bad
submission. With these assumptions, it is not hard to show
that there does not exist an equilibrium with perfect enforce-
ment.
Theorem 2 In the setting of strategic violations, the game
has no equilibrium with perfect enforcement.
Although we cannot achieve perfect enforcement in the
strategic setting, we can achieve the next best thing: we can
make the probability of a bad posting as low as we want.
More precisely, for all , ′ > 0, there is an -Nash equilib-
rium such that the probability of a bad posting is ′.
The idea now is that, with some probability, a submitted
posting will not be checked; there will be no attempt to get
volunteers to monitor that submission. Let ct = 0 if there
is no monitoring in round t; ct = 1 otherwise. The decision
regarding whether to monitor is made after the agent chosen
to submit, pt, submits their posting (otherwise, pt will always
submit something bad in round t if ct = 0). If ct = 0, then
whatever pt submits is posted in that round, whether it is good
or bad. As before, if an agent submits a bad posting and there
is monitoring, we assume that the bad posting definitely will
be detected and discarded, so the submitting agent gets utility
0 in that round. The utility of agent i in round t now becomes
uti =

1 if i = pt and f t = 0;
κ if i = pt, f t = 1, ct = 0 ∨ (ct = 1, vt = 0);
−α if i = vt;
0 otherwise.
Suppose that the normative organisation decides that post-
ings will be monitored with probability 1−1/κ. Further sup-
pose that an agent uses a randomised algorithm: with proba-
bility β it submits a good posting, and with probability 1− β
it submits a bad posting. The agent’s expected payoff is then
β + (1 − β)(1/κ)κ = 1, independent of β. Thus, we get
an equilibrium in the single-shot game if monitoring occurs
with probability 1−1/κ and agents submit bad postings with
probability β, for all choices of β, provided that there is al-
ways guaranteed to be a monitor available. We will show that
again there is an equilibrium in threshold policies. As long as
there are not too many tokens in the system, there are bound
to be some agents with fewer than the threshold number of
tokens, so there will be a volunteer.
We assume the designer of the MAS specifies a value β∗
(that, intuitively, should be a small ‘tolerable’ probability of
a violation occurring). If a monitor that finds a violation is
paid 1/β∗ tokens, then essentially the same type of mecha-
nism as that proposed for the case of unintentional violations
will work, provided that we get bad submissions with prob-
ability exactly β∗. So, perversely, in this setting, while all
strategies are equally good for the submitting agent, the MAS
actually wants to encourage agents to submit something bad
with probability β∗, so that monitors again get an expected
payment of 1 token. The way to do this is for the norma-
tive organisation to announce that it will track the number of
bad submissions, and if the fraction of submissions that have
been bad up to round t is β, checks will happen with proba-
bility 1−β∗/(βκ). Thus, if β = β∗, then checks happen with
probability 1 − 1/κ, and we have an equilibrium. Moreover,
the payment (1/β tokens) is exactly what is needed to ensure
that, in equilibrium, monitoring occurs with probability β∗.
For if β < β∗, then the check will happen with probability
less than 1−1/κ, which means that agents will want to make
more bad submissions. On the other hand, if β > β∗, then
monitoring will happen with probability greater than 1−1/κ,
and agents will want to make fewer bad submissions. Thus, in
equilibrium, we get bad submissions with probability exactly
β∗.
To summarise, we have the following mechanism, given a
threshold k. If an agent is chosen to submit, it submits bad
content with probability β∗ and good content with probabil-
ity 1 − β∗. After the agent has decided what to submit and
made the posting available, the normative organisation de-
cides whether the posting will be monitored. For an initial
period (say 1,000 rounds), a submission is monitored with
probability 1 − 1/κ; afterwards, if the fraction of submis-
sions that have been discovered to be bad due to monitoring
is β and β is more than (say) two standard deviations from β∗,
then monitoring occurs with probability 1 − β∗/(βκ). If the
decision has been made to monitor, and the submitting agent
has at least one token (so that a submission can be made), the
submitting agent asks for volunteers; all agents with fewer
than k tokens volunteer to monitor and one is chosen at ran-
dom to be the monitor. As in the case of unintentional vio-
lations, if at least one agent volunteers, then the submitting
agent gives a randomly chosen agent with less than k+ 1/β∗
tokens one more. If the monitor approves the submission, it
is posted. If the monitor finds a problem with the submission,
then a randomly chosen agent with at least 1/β∗ tokens gives
the monitor 1/β∗ tokens and the submission is discarded.
Theorem 3 For all  > 0, there exist a δ sufficiently close
to 1 and an n sufficiently large such that if all n agents use
a discount factor δ′ ≥ δ, then there exists a k such that the
mechanism above with all agents using a threshold of k is an
-Nash equilibrium.
Note that, in the equilibrium whose existence is stated in The-
orem 3, the probability of a bad submission is β∗, as desired.
5 Additional Content
In [Alechina et al., 2018], we provide proofs of the theorems,
describe how to make the system more distributed and reduce
the role of normative organisation, and show using simula-
tions that our theoretical results, that apply to systems with
a large number of agents, hold for multi-agent systems with
as few as 1000 agents—the system rapidly converges to the
steady-state distribution of scrip tokens necessary to ensure
monitoring and then remains close to the steady state. We
also compare our work to related work on scrip systems and
monitoring in multi-agent systems.
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